We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on such that, for every E 2 E, f (E) coincides with the best elements of E relative to R. We re-interpret choice structures in terms of belief revision. An interpretation is obtained by adding a valuation V that assigns to every atom p the subset of at which p is true. Associated with an interpretation is an initial belief set and a partial belief revision function. A choice frame is AGM-consistent if, for every interpretation of it, the associated partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision function that satis…es the AGM postulates. It is shown that a …nite choice frame is AGM-consistent if and only if it is rationalizable.
Introduction
The dominant theory of belief revision is due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] and is known as the AGM theory. In their approach beliefs are modeled syntactically as sets of formulas and belief revision is construed as an operation that associates with every deductively closed set of formulas K (thought of as the initial beliefs) and formula (thought of as new information) a new set of formulas B K ( ) representing the new beliefs after revising by .
We establish a correspondence between the AGM theory and the set-theoretic structures studied in rational choice theory (also known as revealed preference theory; see, for example, [22] and [24] ). Rational choice theory considers structures h ; E; f i consisting of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f from E into the set of subsets of , representing choices made. The main objective of rational choice theory is to investigate the conditions under which the function f can be rationalized by a total pre-order R on in the sense that, for every E 2 E, f (E) coincides with the best elements of E relative to R.
We re-interpret choice structures in terms of belief revision. The set is now interpreted as a set of states. A model based on (or an interpretation of) a choice structure is obtained by adding to it a valuation V that assigns to every atomic formula p the set of states at which p is true. Truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is then obtained as usual. Given a model I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments.
h ; E; f; V i we de…ne the initial beliefs as the set of formulas such that f ( ) is a subset of the truth set of , denoted by jj jj. Hence f ( ) is interpreted as the set of states that are initially considered possible. We then interpret the collection of events (sets of states) E as a set of possible items of information. If is a formula such that k k 2 E, we de…ne the revised beliefs upon learning that as the set of formulas such that f (jj jj) jj jj. Thus the event f (jj jj) is interpreted as the set of states that are considered possible after learning that is the case. Hence associated with every model is a partial belief revision function (partial because, in general, it is not the case that, for every formula , k k 2 E, that is, not every piece of information is potentially available or contemplated). We say that a choice frame h ; E; f i is AGM-consistent if, for every model based on it, the associated partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision function that satis…es the AGM postulates. We show that, when the set of states is …nite, the properties of AGM-consistency and rationalizability are equivalent.
In the next section we review the notion of belief function and the AGM postulates. In Section 3 we develop the correspondence between AGM belief revision and rational choice. Section 4 contains a brief discussion of related literature and concluding remarks.
Belief revision functions
Let be the set of formulas of a propositional language based on a countable set A of atomic formulas.
1 Given a subset K , its PL-deductive closure [K] P L (where 'PL' stands for Propositional Logic) is de…ned as follows:
P L if and only if there exist 1 ; :::; n 2 K (with n 0) such that ( 1^: ::^ n ) ! is a tautology (that is, a theorem of Propositional
there is no formula such that both and :
which is deductively closed. Let K be a consistent belief set representing the agent's initial beliefs and let be a set of formulas representing possible items of information. A belief revision function based on K is a function B K : ! 2 (where 2 denotes the set of subsets of ) that associates with every formula 2 (thought of as new information) a set B K ( ) (thought of as the revised beliefs).
2 If 6 = then B K is called a partial belief revision function, while if = then B K is called a full belief revision function. De…nition 1 Let B K : ! 2 be a (partial) belief revision function and B K : ! 2 a full belief revision function. We say that B K is an extension of B K if, for every 2 ,
A full belief revision function is called an AGM function if it satis…es the following properties, known as the AGM postulates: 8 ; 2 ;
1 Thus is de…ned recursively as follows: if p 2 A then p 2 and if ; 2 then : 2 and ( _ ) 2 . 2 In the literature it is common to use the notation K or K instead of B K ( ), but for our purposes the latter notation is clearer. AGM1 requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed. AGM2 requires that the information be believed. AGM3 says that beliefs should be revised minimally, in the sense that no new formula should be added unless it can be deduced from the information received and the initial beliefs.
3 AGM4 says that if the information received is compatible with the initial beliefs, then any formula that can be deduced from the information and the initial beliefs should be part of the revised beliefs. AGM5 requires the revised beliefs to be consistent, unless the information is a contradiction (that is, : is a tautology). AGM6 requires that if is propositionally equivalent to then the result of revising by be identical to the result of revising by . AGM7 and AGM8 are a generalization of AGM3 and AGM4 that "applies to iterated changes of belief. The idea is that if B K ( ) is a revision of K [prompted by ] and B K ( ) is to be changed by adding further sentences, such a change should be made by using expansions of B K ( ) whenever possible. More generally, the minimal change of K to include both and (that is, B K ( ^ )) ought to be the same as the expansion of B K ( ) by , so long as does not contradict the beliefs in B K ( )" (Gärdenfors [12] , p. 55; notation changed to match ours). 4 We now turn to a semantics for belief revision, using structures that are known in rational choice theory as choice functions. We shall call them choice frames.
3 Choice frames and AGM belief revision De…nition 2 A choice frame is a triple h ; E; f i where is a non-empty set of states (or possible worlds); subsets of are called events. E 2 is a collection of events (2 denotes the set of subsets of ) such that ? = 2 E and 2 E.
f : E ! 2 is a function that associates with every event E 2 E an event f (E) satisfying the following properties: (1) f (E) E and (2) f (E) 6 = ?:
In rational choice theory a set E 2 E is interpreted as a set of available alternatives and f (E) is interpreted as the subset of E which consists of the chosen alternatives (see, for example, [22] and [24] ). In our case, we think of the elements of E as possible items of information and the interpretation of f (E) is that, if informed that event E has occurred, the agent considers as possible all and only the states in f (E). The set f ( ) is interpreted as the states that are initially considered possible. 5 In order to interpret a choice frame h ; E; f i in terms of belief revision we need to add a valuation V : A ! 2 that associates with every atomic formula p 2 A the set of states at which p is true. The quadruple h ; E; f; V i is called a model (or an interpretation) of h ; E; f i. Given a model M = h ; E; f; V i, truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is de…ned recursively as follows (! j= M means that formula is true at state ! in model M):
P L ). 5 Notice that, in general, E may be a "small" subset of 2 . In the revealed preference approach, this is because one might only have a limited number of observations concerning the choices made by an individual (given menu sets E 1 ; :::; En the agent was observed choosing f (E 1 ); :::; f (En), respectively). In the belief revision interpretation, an introspective agent (e.g. a doctor) might consider how she would change her beliefs if she received various pieces of information (e.g. laboratory results), but might be able, or willing, to consider only a limited number of possible items of information.
! j= M ( _ ) if and only if either ! j= M or ! j= M (or both). The truth set of formula
Given a model M = h ; E; f; V i we say that the agent initially believes that if and only if f ( ) k k M , the agent believes that upon learning that if and only if (1) 
Accordingly, we can associate with every model a (partial) belief revision function as follows. Let
We address the following question: what properties must a choice frame satisfy in order for it to be the case that the (typically partial) belief revision function associated with an arbitrary interpretation (or model) of it can be extended to a full AGM belief revision function? This is the motivation for the following de…nition.
De…nition 3 A choice frame h ; E; f i is AGM-consistent if, for every model M = h ; E; f; V i based on it, the (partial) belief revision function B K M associated with M (see (1)) can be extended (see De…nition 1) to a full belief revision function that satis…es the AGM postulates.
We want to …nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a choice frame to be AGMconsistent.
Remark 4
It is shown in the Appendix (Lemma 17) that a necessary condition for AGMconsistency is the following, which is known in the rational choice literature as Arrow's Axiom (see [24] , p. 25):
Arrow's Axiom, however, is not su¢ cient for AGM-consistency, as the following example shows: 8 = f ; ; ; ; "g, E = f ; f ; ; g; f ; ; gg f ( ) = f"g, f (f ; ; g) = f g and f (f ; ; g) = f ; g: 6 A valuation V (and corresponding model M) associates with every state ! 2 a maximally consistent set of formulas m(!) = f 2 : ! j= M g. Let M denote the set of maximally consistent sets of formulas. Then a valuation is equivalent to a choice of a label function from to M (see [19] and [21] ). 7 It is straightforward to show that, for every model M, K M is a consistent and deductively closed set (a proof can be found in [8] ). 8 Another well-known condition, which is necessary but not su¢ cient for AGM-consistency, is the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (W ARP ):
WARP is stronger than Arrow's Axiom as can be seen in the example of Figure 1 , which satis…es Arrow's Axiom but not W ARP (take E = f ; ; g and F = f ; ; g). To see that W ARP is not su¢ cient for AGM-consistency consider the following frame:
This frame satis…es W ARP vacuously, but is not rationalizable (see De…nition 5 and Proposition 6) and thus, by Proposition 8, is not AGM-consistent.
This choice frame is illustrated in Figure 1 , where the elements of E are shown as rectangles and the values of the function f are shown as ovals inside the rectangles. This choice frame satis…es Arrow's Axiom trivially (for E; F 2 E, E F if and only if F = and, for every E 2 Enf g; f ( ) \ E = ?). Consider the model based on this frame where, for some atoms p; q; r and s, jjpjj = f ; ; g, jjqjj = f ; ; g, jjrjj = f ; g and jjsjj = f g. The initial beliefs are given by the consistent and deductively closed set K = f 2 : " j= g. For every formula such that k k 2 E, let B K ( ) = f 2 : f (k k) k kg be the revised beliefs after receiving information . It is straightforward to check that f(q^r); sg B K (p) and
Suppose that In rational choice theory a choice frame h ; E; f i is said to be rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order 9 R on such that, for every E 2 E, f (E) is the set of best elements of E relative to R (see De…nition 5 below). In that context, the relation R is interpreted as a preference relation (!R! 0 if and only if ! is considered to be at least as good as ! 0 ). In our case R can be interpreted as a plausibility relation: !R! 0 if and only if state ! is considered to be at least as plausible as state ! 0 . Given this interpretation, if the frame is rationalizable then, after receiving information E, the agent considers as possible (according to his revised beliefs) all and only the states that are most plausible among the ones in E. 9 A binary relation R is a total pre-order if it satis…es the following properties: Completeness: 8!; ! 0 2 , either !R! 0 or ! 0 R! (or both), Transitivity: 8!; ! 0 ; ! 00 2 , if !R! 0 and ! 0 R! 00 then !R! 00 . Note that completeness implies re ‡exivity (8! 2 , !R!).
De…nition 5 A choice frame h ; E; f i is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on such that, for every E 2 E,
The following proposition, due to Hansson ([16] , Theorem 7, p. 455) gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a choice frame to be rationalizable.
Proposition 6 A choice frame h ; E; f i is rationalizable if and only if it satis…es the following property: for every sequence hE 1 ; :::; E n ; E n+1 i in E with
For instance, in the example illustrated in Figure 1 , letting n = 2, E 1 = f ; ; g, E 2 = f ; ; g and E 3 = E 1 we have that E 1 \f (E 2 ) = f ; g 6 = ? and E 2 \f (E 1 ) = f g 6 = ? and thus
, so that, by Proposition 6, the frame is not rationalizable.
The following propositions are proved in the Appendix. The …rst states that, when is …nite, rationalizability implies AGM-consistency and the second that, when is countable, AGM-consistency implies rationalizability.
Proposition 7
Putting together Propositions 7 and 8 we get that, when the set of states is …nite, the two properties of AGM-consistency and rationalizability are equivalent.
Corollary 9 Let h ; E; f i be a choice frame where is …nite. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) h ; E; f i is AGM-consistent, (b) h ; E; f i is rationalizable.
The restriction to …nite frames in Proposition 7 can be dropped if the frame h ; E; f i is rationalizable by a total pre-order R that satis…es the property that every non-empty subset of has a best element.
De…nition 10 A choice frame h ; E; f i is strongly rationalizable if it is rationalizable by a total pre-order R such that, for every non-empty E , best R E 6 = ?.
11
A rationalizable choice frame h ; E; f i where is …nite is strongly rationalizable. Thus Proposition 7 is a corollary of the following result (a proof can be found in [8] ).
Proposition 11 Let h ; E; f i be a strongly rationalizable choice frame. Then h ; E; f i is AGM-consistent.
1 0 In the rational choice literature the preference relation is usually denoted by and the set f! 2 E : ! ! 0 ; 8! 0 2 Eg is referred to as the set of maximal elements of E. In the arti…cial intelligence literature, the preference or plausibility relation is usually denoted by and the set f! 2 E : ! ! 0 ; 8! 0 2 Eg is referred to as the set of minimal elements of E. In order to avoid confusion, we denote the relation by R and refer to the best elements of a set. 1 1 A rationalizable frame may fail to be strongly rationalizable. For example, let N denote the set of natural numbers and let = N [ f1g. Let G be the set of …nite subsets of N and E = G [ f g. Finally, let f ( ) = f1g and, for every E 2 G; let f (E) be the largest number in E. Then the choice frame h ; E; f i so de…ned is rationalizable by the total pre-order (with the convention that 1 > n for every n 2 N). However, it is not strongly rationalizable. Suppose it were strongly rationalizable in terms of a total preorder R on . Then ? 6 = best R N N. Fix an arbitrary n 2 best R N and let E = fn; n + 1g. By hypothesis, f (E) = best R E. Since E N and E \ best R N 6 = ?,
if n + 1 2 best R N: But f (E) = fn + 1g, yielding a contradiction.
Related literature and conclusion
Choice frames provide a semantics for AGM belief revision which can be considered an extension of Grove's [15] system of spheres semantics to the class of partial belief revision functions. In the Appendix we review the notion of system of spheres and prove Propositions 7 and (a weaker version of) 8 using Grove's characterization of AGM functions. 12 Choice frames o¤er a Kripke-style (Kripke [20] ) semantics for belief revision. Recently there have been several attempts to model belief revision along the lines pioneered by Hintikka [17] for static beliefs, namely using a modal logic framework that, on the semantic side, relies on Kripke-style structures. Important work in this new area was done by Segerberg ([23] ) in the context of dynamic doxastic logic, Board [5] in the context of multi-agent doxastic logic and van Benthem [3] in the context of dynamic epistemic logic (see also [2] , [9] and the recent survey in [10] ). More closely related to the analysis of this paper is Bonanno [6] where belief revision is studied within a temporal logic, which, on the semantic side, relies on branching-time frames where with each instant are associated two relations, one representing beliefs and the other representing information. As shown in [7] , one can view such branching-time frames as a temporal generalization of the choice frames considered in this paper.
We conclude by noting that Corollary 9 can be viewed as analogous to the frame characterization results of modal logic (see, for example, [4] ): given a …nite rationalizable choice frame, every model based on it gives rise to a partial belief revision function which can be extended to a full AGM function and, conversely, a frame with this property must be rationalizable.
A Appendix
We shall prove Proposition 7 using Grove's [15] notion of system of spheres, which we recall below. As before, let A be an in…nitely countable set of atoms and the set of propositional formulas built on A. Let M be the set of maximally consistent sets of formulas for the propositional logic whose set of formulas is . If H let M H = fx 2 M : H xg. For a formula we shall write M instead of M f g .
De…nition 12
A system of spheres centered on X M is a collection S of subsets of M satisfying the following properties: (S.1) For all U; V 2 S, either U V or V U ; (S.2) X is the smallest element of S, that is, X 2 S and, for every U 2 S, X U ; (S.3) M 2 S; (S.4) if is a consistent formula, then there exists a smallest sphere in S denoted by S( ) intersecting M (if is a contradiction, de…ne S( ) to be M).
Notation 13 For every
Theorem 14 (Grove [15] ) If K is a consistent belief set and S a system of spheres centered on M K then the function B K :
is an AGM function based on K. Conversely, if B K is an AGM function based on a consistent belief set K, then there exists a system of spheres S centered on M K such that, for every formula ,
Let h ; E; f i be a frame and V a valuation, giving rise to the model M = h ; E; f; V i. As noted in Footnote 6, we can associate with M a function m : ! M as follows:
In fact, for every formula ,
Proof of Proposition 7.
14 Let h ; E; f i be a …nite rationalizable frame and let R be a total pre-order on such that, for every E 2 E, f (E) = best R E. For every ! 2 , let D(!) = f! 0 2 : ! 0 R!g and let = fD(!) : ! 2 g. Since is …nite, can be written as a sequence hD 0 ; :::; D n i satisfying:
, for all j = 0; :::; n 1, (iii) D n = and (iv) for every E 2 E, since f (E) = best R E 6 = ?, f (E) = E \ D r(E) where r(E) is the smallest index j 2 f0; :::; ng such that E \ D j 6 = ?: 
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 8. For the case where the frame h ; E; f i is such that E is a countable set, Proposition 8 can also be proved using Grove's approach. First of all, as Grove ([15] , p. 160) notes, a system of spheres centered on X is equivalent to a total pre-order 6 on M that satis…es the following properties:
(S61) X = min 6 M (where, for every T M, min 6 T = fx 2 T : x 6 y; 8y 2 T g), (S62) if is a consistent formula, then min 6 M 6 = ?: Theorem 14 can thus be restated in terms of a total pre-order 6 on M. We shall make use of the following related result in Gärdenfors and Rott ([14] , Theorem 4.4.1, p. 79), which, in turn, is based on a result of Katsuno and Mendelzon ([18] , Theorem 3.3, p. 269). 17 Theorem 15 (Gärdenfors and Rott [14] ) B K : ! 2 is an AGM belief revision function based on a consistent belief set K if and only if there exists a total pre-order 6 on M such that, (1) M K = min 6 M and (2) for every formula ,
When E is a countable set, the above theorem can be used to prove Proposition 8 by constructing a model where, for every E 2 E, there is an atom p E 2 A such that kp E k = E.
Proof of Proposition 8 when E is countable. Let h ; E; f i be an AGM-consistent frame where and E are countable sets. Construct a model where, for every ! 2 there is an atom p ! 2 A such that V (p ! ) = f!g and for every E 2 Enf g there is an atom p E 2 A such that V (p E ) = E. Let B K be the associated (partial) belief revision function and B K an AGM extension of B K (it exists since the frame is AGM-consistent). By Theorem 15 there exists a total pre-order 6 of M such that
De…ne R as follows: !R! 0 if and only if m(!) 6 m(! 0 ) (recall that m : ! M is de…ned by m(!) = f 2 : ! j= g). First we show that f ( ) = best R . Fix arbitrary ! 2 f ( ) and ! 0 2 . By de…nition of K (see (1)), m(f ( )) M K . Thus, by (a) of (5), m(!) 6 m(! 0 ); hence !R! 0 . Since ! 0 was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that ! 2 best R . Hence, since ! 2 f ( ) was chosen arbitrarily, f ( )
is not the case that m( ) 6 m( ). Hence it is not the case that R , contradicting the hypothesis that 2 best R . Now let E 2 E with E 6 = . We want to show that
, it is not the case that m( ) 6 m( ). Hence it is not the case that R , contradicting the hypothesis that 2 best R E.
The assumption that E is a countable set is restrictive. For example, it rules out the case where = N (the set of natural numbers) and E = 2
N . An alternative proof, which does not require the assumption that E is countable, is given below. This proof may be of independent interest, since it is not based on the notion of system of spheres. Instead it relies on Hansson's result (Proposition 6). We begin with several lemmas. This …rst lemma is well known and the proof is omitted (a proof is given in [8] ). The second lemma does not require any restrictions on the sets and E.
Lemma 16 Let H and 2 . Then, for every formula ,
Lemma 17 If h ; E; f i is an AGM consistent choice frame then it satis…es Arrow's Axiom:
Proof. Fix arbitrary E; F 2 E such that E F and E \ f (F ) 6 = ? and suppose that
Construct a model based on this frame where, for some atoms p, q and r, kpk = E, kqk = F and krk = f!g. Let B K be the associated (partial) belief revision function and B K be an AGM extension of B K (it exists since, by hypothesis, the frame is AGM consistent). Since kpk = E 2 E and f (E) E F = kqk, q 2 B K (p) and thus q 2 B K (p). Since p is not a contradiction, byAGM5 B K (p) is consistent. Thus :q = 2 B K (p) and therefore, by AGM7 and AGM8,
P L : It follows from this and (6) that
Since ! = 2 f (E) and krk = f!g, f (E) k:rk, that is, :r 2 B K (p) and hence (since B K is an extension of B K )
Since ! 2 E, ! 2 kr^pk. Thus, since ! 2 f (F ), f (F ) \ kr^pk 6 = ? so that f (F ) * k: (r^p)k = k(p ! :r)k and thus, (p ! :r) = 2 B K (q) = B K (q). Hence, by Lemma 16,
This, together with (7), contradicts (8).
As before, construct a model where, for some atoms p, q and r, kpk = E, kqk = F and krk = f!g. A repetition of the argument used above (leading to (6) , making use of the hypotheses that E F and E \ f (F ) 6 = ?) yields (7). Since ! = 2 f (F ) and krk = f!g, f (F ) k:rk and thus, since kqk = F , :r 2 B K (q) = B K (q), which implies that
On the other hand, since ! 2 f (E) and kpk = E, :r = 2 B K (p) = B K (p). This, together with (7), contradicts (9) .
De…nition 18 Let F = h ; E; f i and F + = h ; E + ; f + i be two choice frames. We say that F + is an extension of F if E E + and, for every E 2 E, f
Lemma 19 Let F = h ; E; f i be an AGM-consistent choice frame where is a (possibly in…nite) countable set. Let hE 1 ; :::; E n ; E n+1 i be a sequence in E such that E n+1 = E 1 and, 8k = 1; :::; n, E k \ f (E k+1 ) 6 = ?. Let G = E 1 [ ::: [ E n . Then there exists an extension F + = h ; E + ; f + i of F such that (i) E + = E [ fGg, and (ii) 8k = 1; :::; n; if
Furthermore, there exists a j 2 f1; :::; ng such that
Proof. Let F = h ; E; f i be an AGM-consistent frame where is countable and …x an arbitrary sequence E 1 ; :::; E n+1 in E such that E n+1 = E 1 and, 8k = 1; :::; n, E k \f (E k+1 ) 6 = ?. Let G = E 1 [ ::: [ E n . If G 2 E, then the result follows from Lemma 17 (take F + = F and apply Arrow's Axiom). Suppose, therefore, that G = 2 E. Construct a model based on this frame where for every state ! 2 there is an atom p ! such that kp ! k = f!g: Furthermore, for every i 2 f1; :::; ng; let p i be an atom such that kp i k = E i : Let B K be the associated (partial) belief revision function and let B K be an AGM extension of B K (it exists since, by hypothesis, F is AGM-consistent). Let J = fi 2 f1; :::; ng :
First we show that J 6 = ?. Suppose that J = ?: Then, for every i 2 f1; :::; ng, :p i 2 B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ). Hence, since (by AGM1) B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ) is deductively closed, (:p 1^: ::^:p n ) 2 B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ): Thus, since (:p 1^: ::^:p n ) is equivalent to :(p 1 _ ::: _ p n ),
By AGM2,
Since (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ) is not a contradiction, by AGM5, B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ) is consistent, so that, for every formula , it is not the case that both and : belong to B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ); contradicting (11) and (12) . Thus J 6 = ?: De…ne h ; E + ; f + i as follows:
Fix an arbitrary k 2 f1; :::; ng and suppose that E k \ f + (G) 6 = ?. We want to show that
First we show that k 2 J. Suppose that k = 2 J, that is,
Since, by hypothesis,
and thus, by (13) , there exists an
Since s 2 J, :p s = 2 B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ). Thus, by AGM7 and AGM8 (and noting that p s is equivalent to ((p 1 _ ::: _ p n )^p s )),
It follows from (15), (16) and Lemma 16 (and the fact that, by AGM1,
Since (:p k ! (p s ! :p k )) is a tautology and (by AGM1) B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ) is deductively closed, (:p k ! (p s ! :p k )) 2 B K (p 1 _ ::: _ p n ). It follows from this and (14) that
Thus we have shown that k 2 J, that is,
Hence, by (13) 
By (18) and AGM7 and AGM8 (and noting that (p 1 _ :::
Hence, by (19) and Lemma 16,
Since 2 f + (G), there exists an s 2 J such that 2 f (E s ). 
It only remains to show that there exists a j 2 f1; :::; ng such that E j \ f + (G) 6 = ?:
f (E j ), it follows that there exists a j 2 f1; :::; ng such that f (E j ) =
f (E j ) \ f + (G). By de…nition of choice frame, ? 6 = f (E j ) E j . Thus E j \ f + (G) 6 = ?:
Lemma 20 Let F = h ; E; f i be a choice frame and let hE 1 ; :::; E n ; E n+1 i be a sequence in E such that E n+1 = E 1 and, 8k = 1; :::; n, E k \ f (E k+1 ) 6 = ?. Let G = E 1 [ ::: [ E n and let F + = h ; E + ; f + i be an extension of F such that (i) E + = E [ fGg and (ii) 8k = 1; :::; n; if
. Then, for every k = 1; :::; n if E k+1 \ f + (G) 6 = ? then
<
:
Proof. Fix a k 2 f1; :::; ng and assume that E k+1 \ f + (G) 6 = ?. Then, by hypothesis (ii), f (E k+1 ) = E k+1 \ f + (G): Thus
By hypothesis, E k \ f (E k+1 ) 6 = ?. Thus, by (24) , E k \ E k+1 \ f + (G) 6 = ? so that
It follows from (25) and hypothesis (ii) that f (E k ) = E k \ f + (G), so that
From (24) and (26) we get that
Corollary 21 Let F = h ; E; f i be a choice frame and let hE 1 ; :::; E n ; E n+1 i be a sequence in E such that E n+1 = E 1 and, 8k = 1; :::; n, E k \ f (E k+1 ) 6 = ?. Let G = E 1 [ ::: [ E n and let F + = h ; E + ; f + i be an extension of F such that (i) E + = E [ fGg, (ii) 8k = 1; :::; n; if
G) and (iii) there exists a j 2 f0; :::; n 1g such that E j+1 \ f + (G) 6 = ?. Then, for every k = 1; :::; n; E k \ f (E k+1 ) = f (E k ) \ E k+1 .
Proof. By Lemma 20, E j \ f (E j+1 ) = f (E j ) \ E j+1 and E j \ f + (G) 6 = ?. Thus applying the lemma again we get E j 1 \ f (E j ) = f (E j 1 ) \ E j (taking j 1 = n if j = 1). Repeating this argument n 1 times (interpreting j r as n (j r) if j r < 1) yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let F = h ; E; f i be an AGM-consistent choice frame where is a (possibly in…nite) countable set. Let hE 1 ; :::; E n ; E n+1 i be a sequence in E such that
